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Achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim of limiting average global temperature increases to 1.5⁰C requires 
substantial changes in the land system. However, individual countries’ plans to accomplish these changes
remain vague, almost certainly insufficient and unlikely to be implemented in full. These shortcomings are
partially the result of avoidable ‘blind spots’ relating to time lags inherent in the implementation of land-
based mitigation strategies. Key blind spots include inconsistencies between different land system policies,
spatial and temporal lags in land system change, and detrimental consequences of some mitigation options.
We suggest that improved recognition of these processes is necessary to identify achievable mitigation
actions, avoiding excessively optimistic assumptions and consequent policy failures.
2Human land use contributes approximately one quarter of anthropogenic emissions and severely constrains
the expansion of terrestrial carbon sinks 1,2. Limiting average global temperature increases to between 1.5°C
and 2°C, as agreed in 2015 by the 195 signatories to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change ‘Paris
Agreement’ 3, will therefore require substantial interventions in the land system in the absence of dramatic
reductions in fossil fuel emissions 2,4. Planned interventions include the prevention of further deforestation,
reforestation (or afforestation) over millions of hectares, reduction of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions,
and widespread adoption of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage. These are crucial components of
many of the (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by which countries propose to
implement the Paris Agreement (e.g. 5–7), and also of the projected negative emissions pathways that must
complement them 8,9.
These – and additional - mitigation actions must now be implemented very rapidly if the Paris goal is to be
achieved 10,11. However, proper assessment of mitigation options and NDCs requires factoring in the speed
with which ambition and policy translate into beneficial on-the-ground activity. Without this, unrealistic
expectations about the rate and extent of mitigation will delay and eventually preclude the adoption of
appropriate targets 12,13. This effect is already clear in land-based mitigation policies, which are affected by a
number of time lags that are rarely anticipated in the design of mitigation policies 14. Partly as a result, of the
197 countries that have produced NDCs to date (representing 96.4% of global greenhouse gas emissions) 15,
no major industrialised country has yet matched its own ambitions for emissions reductions 10. Of 32
countries (representing 80% of anthropogenic emissions) considered by the independent scientific
organisation Climate Action Tracker, only two (Morocco and the Gambia) are rated as achieving ‘Paris
Agreement compatible’ implementation of their NDCs 16. Global CO2 emissions appear to have risen in both
2017 and 2018 after previously levelling off 1. We argue that such setbacks can and must be avoided by
improved assessment and recognition of the time lags inherent in land system policy-making, management
change, and feedback dynamics.
3Intended actions
NDCs set out a number of relatively consistent approaches to reaching the aim of the Paris Agreement.
Among these, changes in the use, management and cover of land are particularly significant, with land
system sinks by 2030 expected to account for at least an additional 3.7 GtCO2e/y above 2005 levels (or 20-
25% of the emissions from all sectors) 17,18. Of the more than 175 countries that had produced an NDC by
November 2015, nearly 100 explicitly identified mitigation strategies involving land use 17. The most common
single strategy is related to increasing forest carbon sinks by reducing deforestation rates or increasing
reforestation rates. The NDCs of India, Indonesia, Russia, China and, especially, Brazil, all emphasise this
strategy, with Brazil and Indonesia planning to reduce land system emissions more than any other countries
4,6,7,18,19. In Brazil, a 70% reduction in deforestation rates between 2005 and 2013 (from an average of 19,500
km2/y to 5,843 km2/y) prompted plans for further forest-based emissions savings accounting for nearly half
of the global total 17,20. China plans to increase forest stocks by 40 million hectares between 2009 and 2020 5.
Agriculture is also expected to make a crucial contribution through, for instance, reductions in emissions
associated with pesticide and fertiliser production and usage, pasture land restoration, agro-forestry
initiatives, utilisation of agricultural waste products, water and soil conservation, and adoption of new crops
(e.g. 5,7). Widespread bioenergy generation (with carbon capture and storage) is also fundamental to most
projected pathways for achieving the Paris Agreement 9.
Unrealistic NDC objectives
Many of the proposals contained in NDCs fall short of the ‘transformative’ change required by the Paris
Agreement, as they represent or incorporate a continuation of established trends in national land systems 10.
Furthermore, these trends are subject to a range of contingencies that are likely to reduce or negate even
4this insufficient contribution, and which make planned mitigation dependent on consistently high levels of
political will and capacity. One important example is the increase in deforestation that has occurred since
the Paris Agreement, immediately undermining the assumption enshrined in several NDCs that deforestation
rates would continue to slow as they had in the preceding years. For instance, deforestation increased by
29% between 2015 and 2016 in Brazil and by 44% in Colombia 21,22. These increases probably occurred in
response to higher demand for meat, failure to protect forest areas and indigenous peoples’ land rights, and
even the demobilisation of the FARC rebel group, which had previously controlled logging across large areas
in Colombia 20,22,23. Altogether, global emissions from deforestation and land use change appear to have
remained stable since 2007 1. Such setbacks can have fundamental implications for efforts to curb climate
change: derailing ambitious targets, sapping motivation and engendering cynicism. However, experience
shows that they are both more common and more predictable than they appear, often stemming from basic
processes in three main areas: policy development, practical adoption, and indirect, unanticipated effects on
other processes or areas.
Policy development
The voluntary nature of the Paris Agreement means that NDCs are not required to be demonstrably
achievable, and in most cases have no defined plan of implementation even where sufficient political will
and capacity exists 18,24. For instance, EU Member States’ binding targets for up to 40% reductions in GHG
emissions by 2030 rely on net-zero emissions from land-based sectors, but leave very little time for designing
and implementing appropriate land management strategies 25,26. These steps will be further complicated by
ongoing scientific uncertainty about exactly how, and how much, land system mitigation can be achieved 18.
Establishing the new, more ambitious policies that will need to be implemented in the second half of this
century is likely to prove more challenging still 12,27.
5NDCs are therefore highly vulnerable to the complex, short-term and cyclical nature of the policy-making
process. This process involves the repeated assessment of problems, opportunities and potential
interventions, all of which are subject to conflicts between different interests, before final implementation
can occur (Fig. 1). Time lags exist at every stage of this process and can lead to lengthy delays, mistakes and
reversals, affecting every facet of the NDCs within and beyond the land system. Indeed, perhaps the greatest
single threat to achievement of the 1.5⁰ goal (aside from the long delay in adopting such a goal) is the 
likelihood, if not inevitability, of changes in policy objectives. The United States Government’s planned
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is one such example 28, as is the rapid increase in land clearing in
Queensland, Australia, the rate of which rivalled that in Brazil following the rejection of stronger regulations
by the Queensland Parliament 29.
Such changes often result from legitimate democratic processes, driven by concerns about the loss of
livelihoods, traditions and cultures, as well as perceived links between climate science, globalisation, and a
lack of democratic accountability 30. Socio-economic inequalities within and between countries also create
inevitable opposition to mitigation policies that are perceived as disproportionately penalising those who are
most vulnerable and least responsible for global emissions 31. Strategies based on public participation, such
as those that seek to empower indigenous peoples while presuming certain uses of their lands such as
conservation or reforestation, are particularly at risk of failure 7,32.
Equally capable of undermining mitigation policies is conflict between objectives or sections of government,
which occurs at every stage of the policy cycle. This frequently subordinates climate policy to other sectoral
and political considerations, resulting either in a failure to legislate at all (e.g. the Australian Government’s
recent abandonment of emissions targets for the energy sector in line with the Paris Agreement 33), or
contradictory objectives that undermine genuine mitigation (e.g. the Scottish Government’s development of
‘world-leading’ climate policies and simultaneous financial support for fossil fuel extraction 34,35). Problems of
this kind are exacerbated by the multi-functional nature of the land system and consequent trade-offs
6between mitigation and other land-based objectives. A stark example is provided by Oil Palm cultivation in
countries such as Indonesia and, increasingly, Peru, which leads to substantial emissions from deforestation
and peatland degradation 36. Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium policy (designed to reverse the state-supported
spread of Oil Palm plantations) has had limited or even counterproductive effects because of its
incompatibility with existing policies and economic drivers, often producing only temporary slowing of
deforestation in some areas and commensurate increases elsewhere 36,37. Similarly, the decision by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to allow logging and forest resource extraction to recommence after a
moratorium initiated in 2002 has contributed to continuing rapid deforestation 38. The rates of primary
forest loss in the Congo and Indonesia are now 1.5 and 3 times the rate in Brazil, and continue to include
widespread clearance of peatland 39.
Such contradictions between policies are particularly hard to resolve where a lack of institutional capacity
exists, posing major challenges for countries with poorly functioning governance and judicial systems as they
attempt to reduce illegal logging 20,40. Similarly, nominal protections have been ineffectual in changing the
behaviours of companies and communities involved in forest clearance in Indonesia 41, or in controlling
deforestation in the Congo caused by smallholder agriculturalists escaping conflict zones 39. Russia’s
ambitious plans for forest-based mitigation are also likely to be hamstrung by the fragmented, contradictory
and ineffective nature of forest policies at different governance levels 42,43. Even where domestic political
capacity is high, the scope for legislation may be limited by international trading agreements that allow
economic interests to delay or override national policy objectives (e.g. through state-investor dispute
settlement systems) 44,45.
Adoption
Even when implemented, mitigation policies suffer from further time lags as on-the-ground uptake occurs
(Fig. 2). Many NDC actions depend on the willingness of people to adopt innovations in technology, crops or
7management approaches, particularly in the case of voluntary actions that play a substantial role in the
NDCs of the USA, China and India, amongst others. For example, the United States Department of
Agriculture expects voluntary changes in agriculture and forestry to reduce net emissions by 0.12 GtCO2e/y
in 2025 17, while China and India encourage reforestation through voluntary tree planting by all citizens 5,46.
Such voluntary measures are likely to have less impact than those supported by regulations or subsidies,
although they may play an important role in ensuring that local communities can engage meaningfully with
mitigation efforts 20,47. Even where mitigation policies are supported by subsidies or regulations, however,
uptake (or compliance) is generally a gradual, spatially-structured process that depends upon knowledge,
socio-cultural context, personal experience and the presence of charismatic leaders or ‘champions’ who can
initiate widespread action 47,48.
There are already many examples of mitigation policies that have initially failed to deliver their expected
benefits because of delays in uptake. The Brazilian Low Carbon Agriculture programme produced only 5
approved projects in its first year (2010), though uptake has since been rising and now exceeds 25,000
farms, approximately 0.5% of the Brazilian total 49. The 2012 Brazilian Forest Code has also had unexpectedly
low uptake and compliance, perhaps due to inadequate financial incentives 50. It is anticipated that only
around a third of the global mitigation potential in agriculture will be achieved by 2030, with major barriers
existing in the developing world, where clear benefit to farmers must be demonstrated if uptake is to occur
51.
Uptake is likely to take even longer where it depends on a wider range of contingencies, for example where
it spans polities or societies, generally only reaching saturation over decades rather than years as social,
political, technological and economic forces interact (Fig. 2) 52,53. This is apparent in the recent development
of agricultural ‘micro-insurance’ as a risk mitigation response to projected weather extremes. Initial uptake
of this insurance has been very slow and spatially patchy, with uptake across Africa, for example, gradually
increasing from 2005 onwards to cover 0.2% of the population in 2011 and 1.1% in 2014 54,55. Similar
8dynamics are at play in the global spread of Conservation Agriculture (Fig. 2), as practices to preserve soils
and diversify crops are gradually recognised, promoted and adopted in different countries 56. The timescales
involved contrast sharply with those over which political decisions are made, increasing the likelihood of
policies being abandoned or reversed before they have had time to take effect. Significantly for the Paris
Agreement, delays in uptake are greatest where the agricultural sector comprises many small farms, as in
the case of India and, especially, China 57.
Indirect effects
Climate and land system policies are strongly cross-sectoral, with dependencies that span traditionally
discrete areas of research and governance. This can generate another form of time lag via indirect and
counterproductive consequences that delay the achievement of expected mitigation targets. For instance,
many of the changes proposed in the agricultural sector in NDCs depend upon balancing the potential
benefits of intensification (e.g. land sparing) and its potential drawbacks (e.g. enhanced energy inputs,
erosion and decreasing water quality) that tend to fall under the purview of different Government
departments. Failures to adequately anticipate trade-offs of this kind have been a notable feature of climate
policy in the land system, with policies for different sectors and for mitigation and adaptation often being at
odds with one another 58. In particular, mitigation policies focusing on bioenergy have often proved
detrimental to food production, forest cover and, ultimately, the very mitigation targets to which bioenergy
contributes 59. Similarly, EU renewable energy targets have been criticised for causing the loss of established
forests in Europe, and with them important carbon sinks and ecosystems 60. International trade and
telecoupling can make such unanticipated consequences more likely, as when successful regulation of illegal
deforestation in one area increases timber prices and therefore legal deforestation in another area 61, or as
in the case of EU bioenergy production and imports contributing to tropical deforestation 62. International
policy has only dealt with such counter-productive ‘leakage’, whether from public policy or private
(corporate) initiatives, to a very limited extent 62,63.
9Counter-productivities can also result from excessive focus on particular outcomes. For example, failure to
account for emissions of greenhouse gases (such as N2O) from biofuel crop growth offsets their CO2 savings,
while emissions of O3 precursor gases (such as NOx or biogenic volatile organic compounds) in addition
decreases crop yields (as well as negatively affecting biodiversity and human health) 64,65. China’s ‘Grain for
Green’ programme has similarly shown success in meeting its targets as defined, but with some negative
socio-economic and ecological consequences that may undermine its long-term sustainability 66. Both of
these examples may be symptomatic of the ways in which negative impacts of afforestation and bioenergy
production on the provision of ecosystem services can lead to societal resistance or additional emissions,
slowing the rate of effective mitigation 67.
Failure to consider the cross-sectoral context of mitigation actions also risks double-counting their benefits.
This is apparent in the reliance of several countries’ NDCs on existing decreases in rates of deforestation,
implying a fundamental lack of truly additional mitigation, as well as a potential impermanence. As with
Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium, any isolation of mitigation policy from economic drivers is likely to prove
illusory, leading to leakage of destructive pressures to other areas 37. These effects are particularly great
where the real or effective price of carbon is low, allowing other economic drivers to remain dominant, and
where free trade enhances teleconnections 68.
Ensuring achievability
The various dependencies (and acknowledged insufficiencies) of the actions planned in support of the Paris
Agreement mean that achievement of the 1.5⁰C (or even a 2oC) goal is highly unlikely 10,69. Given the urgent
need for climate change mitigation, there are strong arguments to be made for international climate policy
to rely on binding or regulatory commitments that either take a leading role in economic policies or
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supersede them entirely 24,45,70,71. Trading arrangements that actively promote mitigation or formal ‘peer-
review’ of proposed policies have both been suggested as proven options 70,71. However, these approaches
cannot in themselves ensure rapid on-the-ground change, especially given the risks of democratic backlash
and limited responsiveness to both scientific and political developments 30.
A crucial step towards achieving the required level of mitigation is therefore the prioritisation of
behaviourally-literate policy making that better accounts for the dynamics of land system change 72. These
dynamics, as described above, do not simply represent complexities of the policy process, but linked and
often logical responses to difficult, long-term challenges. As a result, the current failure to account for land
system time lags in mitigation is not inevitable. Instead, it is possible – and essential – that these time lags
are better anticipated, so that achievable pathways to limiting global temperature increases can be
developed.
At a basic level, these pathways should ensure obvious and immediate benefits to farmers, smallholders and
foresters who undertake mitigation actions, especially in developing countries where land management
options are scarce 37,51. Beyond such recognised solutions, existing evidence should be better exploited to
identify promising strategies. Empirical studies of time lags in policy-driven land system change can
illuminate political pathways to transformation 73, as well as allowing the incorporation of more realistic
dynamics in models that project future land system dynamics to support policy decisions. To date, such work
has usually focused on case-specificities rather than synthesis 74, leaving policy development to rely on an
assumption of rapid or instantaneous adoption according to generic patterns 14. Furthermore, the sectoral
nature of most analyses means that they are not able to illuminate many of the indirect effects that can
undermine mitigation outcomes 74,75. These shortcomings can actively obscure the time lags identified here if
the limitations of the knowledge base being used are not clear 76.
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We suggest that a small number of specific developments in land system research, modelling and policy
development have the potential to dramatically improve climate mitigation policies by allowing exploration
of the key time lags in policy outcomes. These developments cannot, of course, be allowed to introduce time
lags of their own, and so must complement an immediate recognition of the inherent delays in land system
change.
Firstly, improved recognition, understanding and modelling of the policy-making process should be
prioritised. This can be achieved through ongoing research into governance structures and mechanisms,
including the effects of cross-scale interactions from national to state to regional levels 77,78, and compilation
of a wide range of relevant case studies including by expert elicitation and comparative analyses of political
processes 14,73,79. Meanwhile, the development of agent-based land use models towards representations of
political decision-making can contribute by generating empirically-based projections that inform policy-
development, replacing misleading assumptions 80,81.
Secondly, there is a need for more research into processes and rates of uptake of land management
approaches, allowing efficient targeting of policies as well as improvements to the ‘one-size-fits-all’
assumptions that currently dominate14,82. This is a necessary continuation of attempts to resolve top-down
and bottom-up assessments of emissions reduction potentials 83.
Thirdly, a substantial increase in the number and quality of analyses of indirect and cross-sectoral
consequences of changes in the land system is required. These can build on existing economic assessments
of trading relationships84, increasingly extensive knowledge of inter-sectoral and inter-locational impacts 85,
and recent attempts to model coherent, multi-sectoral land systems 74,86,87. These may also help to identify
promising new strategies such as the use of ‘natural climate solutions’ that use cost-effective land
management changes to provide substantial mitigation alongside a range of other ecosystem service
benefits 88, or ‘burden sharing’ between distinct policy areas 14.
12
Finally, land system models should be embedded in appropriate uncertainty frameworks to identify robust,
location-specific interventions 86, partly through integration of knowledge derived from different modelling
paradigms 89,90.
These developments are significant but achievable, relying on existing and emerging research areas that
have already established their utility. Of particular importance are ongoing moves towards integrative
research that operates across scientific disciplines, case studies and models 91,92, as these not only reveal
‘blind spots’ of the kind identified here, but also ways in which these can be accounted for. Such an
approach is urgently required to identify implementable climate mitigation actions, and therefore to achieve
the transformative changes envisioned by the parties to the Paris Agreement.
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Figure 1. The science-policy exchange cycle and associated time lags: Science-based policy making is a
cyclical process that involves potential time lags (red) at each step, which may also reduce policies’ ultimate
impact. Whilst a cyclical relationship is shown, each lag can occur independently of any other and may
prevent further progression. Time lags underlined in bold are those focused on here. Monitoring of policy
impacts and feedbacks to new scientific research (dashed lines) are particularly uncertain processes that
may not only involve time lags, but may effectively not occur.
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Figure 2. Examples of time lags in uptake of innovations in land use (subsidy schemes, new crops or
management approaches). Individual lines show cumulative uptake of each example, from the year of first
data availability (re-based to year ‘0’; by which point some uptake may have already occurred). An uptake
value of ‘1’ represents the maximum recorded cumulative uptake over the time period, rather than any
measure of potential uptake; the plot therefore compares rates rather than extents of uptake, with ongoing
increases indicating continuation of uptake processes. Uptake is subject to relatively static conditions in
some cases (e.g. subsidy schemes) and influenced by social, economic, technological and political changes in
others (e.g. crop areas). Time periods and data sources: Agricultural insurance policies, Brazil (2006-2016) 93,
Grain for Green subsidies, China (1999-2011) 94, Woodland Grant Scheme subsidies, Scotland (1988-2005) 95,
Genetically engineered crop areas, USA (2000-2017) 96, Conservation Reserve Program, USA (1986-2015) 97,
Oilseed Rape areas, UK (1969-1997) 98, Soy areas, Brazil (1961-1991) 99, Maize area, UK (1984-2014) 100,
Conservation Agriculture areas, worldwide (1974-2013) 56.
